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Table I suggests that countries with an unequal distribution of
income and assets are often charecterísed by higher zates of lnflation.
Although this is only a stylised fact, ít seems worthwile to give an
explanation of why this might be the case. Such an explanation must be
given within tha context of an analysis that highlíghts the interactions
between both economic and political processes. Given the need to flnance a
gíven amount of government revenues, the government has the option of
financing these revenues either through (non-monetary) taxes or through
seigniorage (e.g., Mankiw, 1987). The optimal revenue mix is tilted more
towards seigniorage íf the ruling political party has less of a dislíke for
inllntion, if the cos[s of collectinp, taxes and the extent of tax evasion
is widespread (cf., Canzoneri and Rogers, 1990), and if the fínancial
system is relatively repressed (e.g., Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
Inflation will then be rela[ively high and income tax rates relatively low.
If the central bank is not independent and the government cannot commit
itself to the announced future monetary stance, discretion rather than
rules is the relevant outcome so that seigniorage wíll be relativaly more
important than tax revenues (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Barro, 1983; van dar
Ploeg, 1991). Lack of monetary discipline and credibilíty thus induce
higher inflatíon.
So far, these are just the standard economic linkages. To underatand
the politícal economy of inflation and taxation, one must allow for
heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity arises when different privata agents
have different labour productivities and thus build up dífferant stocks of
assets for their retirement. An unequal society means that a relatívely
large part of the government debt is in [he hands of a relativaly small
group of individuals. When this society is democratic, it thus elects a
political party that represents the interests of poor people. Such a party
has more of an incentive to levy unantícipated inflation taxes and erode
the real value of debt service, because thís hurts the rich more than the
poor. It follows that in a democracy íneyualíty and nominal government debt
sow the seeds of inflation.i
~ This result is related to the idea that inequality is harmful for
growth (Alesina and Rodrick, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1992). The point
being that, for a society in which wealth is unequally distributed, the
median voter is relatively poor and will levy high taxes on capital and
income in order to provide for transfers from the rich to the poor. Such
polícies damage grovth prospects.z
Sections II and III establish, within the context of a public-finance
model of tax and seigniorage smoothing with heterogeneous agents, the
proposition that inflation is high in democratic countries with a lot of
inequality and hígh nominal government debt. Section IV providea some
cross-country evidence for this proposition. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Taxation, seigniorage, government debt and private consumptlon
For simplicity, attention is focussed on steady streams of primary
government spending. In that case one can restríct the analysis to the
steady state. The qualítative character of the results is unaffected if a
transient analysis is conducted, because households want to smooth their
consumption over time and the government wants to smooth tax and
seigniorage revenues over time (cf., Barro, 1979; Mankiw 1987). This latter
result only holds when the velocity of circulation of money ia constant,
because otherwise the government has an incentive to finance permanent
increases in government spendine by ínterest on government assets built up
through temporary bouts of taxatíon and inflation (Obstfeld, 1991; van der
Ploeg, 1991).
Households consume theír income, which consists of income from
production plus interest íncome minus taxes and seigniorage. Household i
thus faces the budget constraínt
(1) C~ - Y~ t( r-n) Di - T~ - S~
where Ci, Y;, Di, Ti and S~ denote consumption, pre-tax income, holdings of
government debt, taxes and seigniorage extracted by the government for
household i, respectively, r denotes the ex-post real interest rate and n
denotes the growth rate in output. To make the point of this paper as
aimple as possible, assume that all households receive the same income and
pay the same amount of taxes and seigniorage. For those variables the
subscript i can be dropped. The only source of heterogeneity among house-
holds is thus differences in holdings of assets: some households hold a lot
of government debt, whereas other households hold little or no government
debt. There are N households. The government must finance its pzimary level
of spending plus interest payments on outstanding debt through extraction
of tax and seigniorage revenues:3
(2) N G t (r-n) N D~ - N (T t S)
where D~ s(D~t..tDN)~N denotes the average level of government debt held by
households and C denotes the exogeneous per-capita level of government
spending. The condltíon for equilibrlum in the goods market !s
(3) N C~ t N G- N Y
where C~ ~(C~t..tCN)~N denotes the average level of private conaumption.
Four behavioural assumptions are needed. First, the ex-ante real rate
of interest is constant, denoted by p, and follows from preferences and
technology. It is assumed that p exceeds the real growth rate n. Second,
the Fisherian hypothesis is adopted so that the nominal ínterest rate ia
simply the sum of the ex-ante real interest rate and the expected rate of
inflation. It follows that the ex-post real ínterest rate is given by
(4) r- p t xe - x
where x and x~ denote the actual and expected inflation rate, reapectively.
'1'hïrd, the quantity theory of money Ls adopted so that the demand for zeal
money balances is a constant proportion, say m, of output:
(5) M~P - m Q
where M, P and Q denote per-capita nominal money balances, the price level
and the non-distortionary per-capita level of output, respectively. It
follows that the rate of inflation is equal to the excess of monetary
growth over the real growth rate of the economy, that is xi~P~P-~-n where
yeAM~M, and that seigniorage extracted from an individual household is
gíven by Sap(M~P)-(xtn)mQ. Fourth, the growth rate of the economy, TuGQ~Q,
is exogeneous and there are output losses arising from taxation and
inflation. More specifically, pre-tax income Ls assumed to be given by
(6) Y- Q [1 - h x~ tZ -~S KZ (xtP)Z1, Kl, rc.2 ~ 0
where t~T~Q denotes the (non-monetary) tax rate. The deadweíght losses are
quedratic ín the tax and inflation rates. There is no cross term (x t),4
which is not too unreasonable when the tax system is indexed to the price
level. The non-distortionary tax rate is zero, whílst the non-distortionary
ínflatíon rate is minus the (ex-ante) real interest rate (-p) as tha full
liquidity rule says that the nomínal interest rate should be driven to
zero. The non-distortíonary level of monetary growth is -(p-n).
IIZ. Unequal distribution of government assets causea inflation
Households obtain utilíty from both private and public conaumption.
Utllity of household 1 is thus given by CitG. The polítical party that is
elected into office represents the interest of its clientele, that is the
median voter. The government thus chooses monetary and fiscal policy (y and
t) to maximise the utility of the median voter (expressed as a fraction of
the non-distortionary level of output),
(~) ~CM t G~~Q -(CM - C~ f Y)~Q -
1 - ~S K~ tz - k K2 ({~tP-n)2 } (PtF~e-l~-n) ( dM - da).
subject to the government budget constraint,
(8) B t (ptl~`-{~-n) d~ - t t P m.
where daU~Q, ggC~Q and the subscript M denotes the median household as far
as the dispersion of government assets and thus of private conaumption Ss
concerned.
IZI.1 Rules
Two outcomes should be distinguished: rules and discretion (denoted
by superscripts R and ~, respectively). Rules presumes that the government
is able to commit itself or, alternatively, has sufficient reputation for
the private sector to firmly believe its announcements about future policy.
Under rules the government can ínfluence the expectations of prívate agents
and can thus take xe-x or p"-p as given when determining ita optimal
monetary and fiscal policies. It follows that:
(9) tR - (K~mzfKz)-~ KZ ~k t (p-n) m~5
(10) {LR ~ (K~mZtK2) ~ ~K~m k - K2 (P-n) J
where ksgt(p-n)d~ denotes (the flow value of) government commitments. As
government commitments increase, it is optimal to raise both the tax and
monetary growth rate (cf., Hankiw, 1987). As a consequence, the inflation
rate and seígniorage revenues increase whilst private consumption falls. An
increase in the output costs of taxation arising from a less efficient tax
system or a fall in the output costs of inflation boost the optimal rates
of monetary growth and inflation and reduce the optimal tax rate. A fall in
the growth-corrected real interest rate (p-n) has similar affacts, because
it raíses the non-distortionary level of monetary growth as given by the
full liquidity rule. A more repressed financial system implies that
households need more money balances (higher m) and thus increases the base
for raising seigniorage revenues. Thís induces a shift in the optlmal
government revenue mix away from tax towards seígniorage revanues. Due to
the fact that the non-distortionary level of inflation is minus the ex-ante
real interest rate, there is an opposite effect leading to a bias in favour
of non-monetary tax revenues. Finally, note that the rules outcome for the
optimal tax and inflation rate is índependent of the manner in which assets
are distributed throughout the population.
III.2 The politlcal economy of discretton
The rules outcome is time inconsistent in the sense that once the
private sector is fooled into believing that monetary growth and inflation
will be low, the government has an íncentive to levy a surprise inflation
tax. By doing this the government erodes the real value of its debt service
and can thus reduce the output costs of taxatíon. In rational expectations
equilibríum the private sc-ctor anticipatc.s that the government has such an
íncentive and thus inflatíon will be higher. Discretion may be more
relevant in practice, since it is relevant when the government cannot
commit itself to its announced íntentíons about future policies. Discretlon
implies that the government must take xe and {~e as given when determining
its optímal policies. It follows that:
(11) t~ - IKim(mtd~)tKzj"~ ~KZ k t ~KZ (P-n) - (d~ - dM)] m] ~ tR
(12) po - (K~m(mtd~)tK2]-~ [K~ (mtd~) k - KZ (P-n) t (d~ - dM)j ~ yR.6
Because the government has no reputation and cannot commit itself, tha
private sector does not believe announcements about low monetary growth. It
follows that under discretíon the welfare of the median voter is lower than
under rules and the government revenue mix is sub-optimal in the sense that
the tax rate is too low and the inflation rate is too high. Basically, the
presence of government debt provides an open invitation to wipe it out with
surpríse inflation and thus lowers the cost of seigniorage.
The distribution of assets matters for the optimal tax and monetary
growth rates. The more unequal wealth ís distributed throughout the
population, i.e. the more the mean exceeds the medían of the distribution
Gf áSáètS thï0iigi~0iit ti72 popuiatloII, ti,2 i~igi~er sOnétáry gï0'ritia ar.u
inflation and the lower the tax rate. The idea ís that when assets are very
unfaírly distributed Chroughout the populatíon the median voter is more
likely to be poor so that in a democracy the polítical party in office will
represent the interests of the poorer segments of the population. Such a
party will find it in the interests of its clientele to levy unanticipated
inflation taxes in an attempt to take from the rich in order to lower (non-
monetary) taxes for all. Hence, an unfair distribution of wealth carries
the seeds of high inflation.
Tho gavernme..~ is ex pc.,.. unable to .edi.,,.rib:...., fro.., the rich tc the
poor, given that all contracts are índexed to the price level, so that both
rich and poor are worse off when the government cannot commit. Utility of
household i can be written as
(13) ci t g- 1- b Kl tZ - ts Kz (I~tP-n)Z t(P-n) (di - d~),
so that rích households have higher utility than poor households. Also,
households with identical holdings of assets experience a higher level of
utility under rules than under discretion and their utility under
discretíon is higher when assets are more equally distributed in society.
IV. Cross-country evidence on inflation, inequality and government debt
To see whether there ís any evidence for the proposition developed in
~:crtionr: I11 ancl iV, r:omu cross-cuun~ ry oviclcnoc on the relarionahí.p
between inflation and inequality is presented in Tables I. M60 and M80 are
measures of inequality around 1960 and 1980, respectively. Since data on
the distríbution of wealth are not available for a wide cross-section of7
countrios, tho in~,qunlity measw~eti iu 'fnblc 1 are based on data for the
distribution of income per head, taken from Alesina and Rodrick (1991).
"1'.~blu l uses Uiu following measurc uf iueyuality: Msl-(mudluu,mean).z In a
society with an unequal distribution of íncomes mean income exceeds median
income, so the measure of inequality M lies between zero and one. Table I
restrícts attention to democratic countries3.
Casual inspection of Table I suggests for all countries, except
Israel, a strong link between inflation and inequality. For example,
countries such as Columbia and Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica
combine a high degree of inequality with high inflation rates. However, it
is clear that Israel, being a remarkably egalitarian society with very high
inflation rates, is an outlier. Hence, excluding Israel, Table II presents
some cross-country regressions of inflation in producer and consumer prices
on a constant and two measures of ineyuality. In all four regressions thera
ís, at the S per cent level, a sígnificant positive effect of inequalíty on
inflatíon.
It is useful to mention that no empírícal evidence for a link between
inflation and inequality could be found for various samples and sub-samples
of upto 43 noii-de~racr~tic countries. Yerhaps, this is not surprising as the
model put forward in sections ii and I.I applies to democratic countzies.
Nun-di~muorati~~ cuuntrios e;uch ns tioulh AI-ricn (MGO~0.4911; PP1608S-0.0904),
Honduras (MGO~-0.525; PYI6U85-0.0578) and E1 Salvador (M60-0.560;
PPI6085-0.0648) are capitalist dictatorships which seem to protect the
interests of rentiers and combine high degrees of inequality with low
ínflation.
The theory put forward ín sections II and III to explain the link
between inequality and inflation is based on the idea that the presence of
an outstanding stock of nomin:~l governmc.ut dc,bt providcs an open invitation
for the government to wipe out the real value of íts debt through unantici-
pated ínflatíon. To test whether there is empirical evidence for the
proposition that in a democracy both inequality and government debt raise
2 If the quintile in which the median income falls earns a percentage
x of total income and one makes the assumption that all members of a
quintile earn the same income, this measure of inequality can be proxied by
M-1-(x~20).
3 Unfortunately, no distribution data were available on a comparative
basis for the democratic countries 8elgium, Creece and Switzerland.a
inflatíon~ and to see whether the experience of Israel can be explained,
Table II also presents the relevant cross-country regressions for the
democratic countries with Israel íncluded. It is remarkable that the
explanatory power of the regressions is much increased, that the effect of
inequality on inflation is almost the same order of magnitude as before,
and that the ratio of government debt to GDP exerts a strong and sig-
nificant additional influence on inflation. The very high inflation rate of
Israel is thus primarily a consequence of its very hígh ratio of government
debt to GDP (2.36), so that the negatíve effect on inflation caused by the
egalitarian nature of Israel's society is not sufficient to off-set the
posítive effect of government debt. Conversely, fairly inegalitarian
societies such as Germany or Japan have nevertheless fairly low inflation
due to their modest ratío's of government debt to GDP.
The cross-country regressions for the democratíc countries suggest
that the difference in the inflation rates of an egalitarían society for
which M ís close to zero aiid an inegalitarian socíety for which M ís around
0.5 ís about eight percentage poínts. The regressions also suggest that a
rise in the ratio of government debt to GDP by about six percentage points
raíses inflation by one percentage poínt. These stylised empirical facts
provide some motivation for the analysis of sections II and III.
V. Conclusion
Cross-country evidence on a positíve línk between inflation and
inequalíty for democratic countries has been presented. The regressions
suggest that the difference in inflation rates of a country in which all
individuals earn the same and a country in which the median íncome is half
of average income is about eight percentage points. The regressions also
suggest that a rise in the ratio of government debt to GDP by about six
percentage points raises inflation by one percentage poínt. These results
are explaíned by a model in which an unequal dispersion of wealth sets the
political conditions for high inflation and low tax rates. When there is
more inequality in society and when there is a large outstanding stock of
nominal government debt, the government is more likely to represent the
~ Of course, there is also a public iinance argwnent for thís
proposition whích says that a hígh level of government commitments requires
more government revenues (including seigniorage) and thus a higher
inflation rate (e.g., Mankiw, 1987).9
interests cf the poor and thus finds it harder to commit itself to a policy
of low inflation. When the analysis is extended to allow for overlapping
generations one can show that a socíety dominated by young paople will
elect political parties that are in favour of taxing the elderly by eroding
the real value of their return on accumulated savings and lowering taxes
for the population at large.s However, many countries of the OECD are
experíencing a greying of the population so that one might expect lower
inflation and higher tax rates in years to come.
Tho I.icnti put forwnrd in this papcr apply to democracies, but ít ís
not dlffícult to extend the argument to non-democretic countries. Populist
dictatorships are likely to serve the interests of the working classes and
to induce high inflation rates whilst capitalist dictatorships are more
likely to protect the interests of rentiers and ensure low inflation rates
despite having hígh degrees of inequality.
This paper has focussed on the political economy of unantíclpated
inflation. However, anticipaced inflation also has real effects when wages,
pensions and benefíts are not fully or not immediately índexed to the price
level and inflation is high. In such círcumstances ínflation may well hurt
the poor more than the rich in which case more inequality induces less
inflation in democratíc countríes. Conversely, given that indexation is not
perfect, more equality induces more inflation.
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Table I: Measures of inequality, inflation and government debt
Country M60 M80 PPI6085 CPI6085 D6085
Australia 0.110 0.125 0.0726 0.0765 0.2749
Canada 0.130 0.115 0.0604 0.0612 0.3165
Columbia 0.550 0.325 0.1703 0.1690 0.1154
Costa Rica 0.440 0.340 0.1309 0.1309 0.2422
Denmark 0.060 0.080 0.0790 0.0843 0.1492
Finland 0.230 0.080 0.0839 0.0875 0.0911
Fl-aucc U.3UU U.14U O.Ulll U.07S9 0.1641
Germany 0.315 0.110 0.0379 0.0416 0.1126
India 0.200 0.185 0.0776 0.0830 0.4535
Israel 0.070 0.110 0.4565 0.4662 2.3599
Italy 0.270 0.165 0.0995 0.1025 0.4685
Jamaica 0.460 0.280 0.1161 0.1252 0.4499
Japan 0.210 0.125 0.0562 0.0667 0.1030
Malaysia 0.215 0.305 0.0370 0.0444 0.4447
Netherlands 0.200 0.105 0.0543 0.0580 0.3249
New Zealand 0.160 0.190 0.0886 0.0914 0.5282
Norway 0.0?5 0.055 0.0661 0.0713 0.2720
Spain 0.2'v0 0.135 0.1085 0.1136 0.1830
Sri Lanka U.310 0.395 0.0954 0.0900 0.5926
Sweden 0.130 0.130 0.0712 0.0784 0.2526
U.K. 0.170 0.090 0.0807 0.0849 0.4938
U.S.n. 0.1'IU O.l)0 O.oh84 0.0530 0.328a
Venetucla U.200 U.:300 O.U711 O.U829 0.0939
Note: M60 - measure of inequality for 1960
M80 ~ measure of i.nequality for 1980
PPIGO85 s geometric average of annual inflation rates in
producer prices during 1960-1985
CYI6U85 - geometric average of aunual inflatíon rates ín
conswner prices duríng 1960-1985
D6085 - aríthmetic average of government debt-GDP ratío's
d~~ring 1960-1985
Source: M60 and M80, Alesina and Rodrick (1991)
PPI6085, CPI6085, Summers and Heston ( 1988) and OECD Main
Economic Indicators
D6085, IMF International Financial Statistics12
Table II: Cross-country regressions of inflation on inequality and
government debt
constant M60 M80 D6085 JB RZ
PPI6085 0.041 0.173 - - 2.69 0.49
(3.93) (4.35)
PP16U85 U.U53 - 0.155 - 0.63 0.24
(4.33) (2.53)
PPI6085~ -0.006 0.165 - 0.173 0.61 0.83
(0.34) (2.59) (9.60)
CPI6085 0.047 0.164 - - 3.25 0.48
(4.70) (4.27)
CPI6085 0.060 - 0.144 - 0.26 0.23
(5.00) (2.45)
CPI6085~ 0.000 0.155 - 0.174 0.76 0.82
(0.01) (2.39) (9.66)
Note: t-ratios are given in brackets
JB - Jarque-Bera test for normalíty, whích is chi-square distributed
under the null hypothesís with two degrees of freedom
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